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Health-adjusted life years (HALYs) are population health measures which describe 
morbidity and mortality combined as one number. HALYs play a fundamental role in 
cost-effectiveness analysis, making it possible to compare the quantity of health-related 
well-being purchasable for a given investment across a range of initiatives. Currently, 
however, no such health measures consider human and non-human animal well-being 
simultaneously, representing both a philosophical and practical void in the field. This 
thesis looks to assess the ethical landscape surrounding the simultaneous assessment of 
inter-species well-being. It analyses various theories of well-being, then discusses various 
possible stances on relative species value and how they might be relevant to the 
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The well-being of non-human animals is becoming an ever more prominent topic of 
discussion and debate. Its rise to the ethical stage has been characterised by an increased 
support for animal rights groups such as People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals 
(PETA), the introduction of legislation recognising animal sentience such as the 
European Union’s Lisbon Treaty (European Union, 2007, p.49) and the rise of flexitarian, 
vegetarian and vegan diets, with 25% of UK millennials now following one of these three 
lifestyle choices (The Vegan Society, 2018). Furthermore, initiatives such as the Effective 
Altruism movement and the Open Philanthropy Project advance animal well-being as a 
large-scale and relatively neglected problem, and consequently recommend related 
charities as particularly worthy causes for donation (Whittlestone, 2018) (Open 
Philanthropy Project, 2018). Currently, various methods exist for conducting cost-
effectiveness analysis on human well-being, health-adjusted life years (HALYs) 
representing some of these, however, none consider human and non-human animal well-
being simultaneously. This leaves us entirely in the dark as to the relative scale of suffering 
across species, and the level of cost-effectiveness represented by non-human animal well-
being initiatives. This thesis will discuss the ethical landscape surrounding well-being 
across all species, considering the various potential factors in assessing relative species 
value, as well as the different approaches to measuring well-being that might be relevant 
to an inter-species measure.  
 
2 HALYs introduced 
 
1.1 Background 
Health-adjusted life years (HALYs) is an umbrella term for health measures which 
describe morbidity and mortality as one combined number and can be considered as a 
kind of population well-being measure. HALYs find use in situations where financing for 
health interventions is financially limited, providing the groundwork for well-being-based 
cost-utility analysis. HALYs come in two forms; quality-adjusted life years (QALYs) 
which consider the benefits of health improvements, and their counterparts disability-
adjusted life years (DALYs) which consider the negative effect of ill-health on well-being. 
QALYs were developed first in the late 1960s and were primarily designed to compare 
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the price of producing a unit of health through different health interventions (Packer, 
1968). Health in QALYs is based on reported values given by individuals for their own 
overall health states and the health states of others, creating a measure of health 
expectancy – a good to be maximised. DALYs followed in 1993 as an attempt by the 
World Health Organisation to assess the Global Burden of Disease (World Bank, 1993). 
Unlike QALYs, DALYs measure health as an expert-assessed value for specific diseases, 
measuring instead a health gap – a bad to be minimized. 
The calculation of a HALY, whether QALY or DALY, broadly follows the same 
general formula. Firstly, a description of health between 0 and 1 is created, either from 
the values given by individuals or by expert opinion. In QALYs, 1 represents full health 
and 0 represents death. In DALYs, this is reversed so that 1 represents full disability 
(death) and 0 represents full health. This Description of health, the health-related quality 
of life (HRQL) measure, is then multiplied by life expectancy to produce either the 
number of years of full health expected (quality-adjusted life years) or the number of years 
of full disability expected (disability-adjusted life years). The general HALY formula is 
depicted in Figure 1 below. In this thesis and for the purposes of considering a broad 
range of ideas about well-being, the term  
 
 
Figure 1: The general HALY formula 
 
1.2 Discussion of HALY Assumptions 
HALYs are typically employed for cost-effectiveness analysis and thereby make certain 
ethical assumptions by promoting the maximisation of well-being interpreted in the form 
of health. For example, the non-profit GiveWell takes a cost-effectiveness approach 
similar to HALYs by recommending donations to Schistosomiasis Control Initiative 
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which de-worms children, this reduces illness and so increases school attendance 
promoting development. De-worming is very cheap and therefore represents 
considerable value for money, however, it has only minor benefits for each individual 
treated. Similarly, HALYs might, because of the cost of their treatment, leave some in 
great suffering and instead prioritise other less serious issues which represent a greater 
health gain per pound spent. This kind of decision-making approach reveals HALYs’ 
utilitarian origins and fundamental aggregative assumption.  
Utilitarianism generally defined is the view that the morally right action is that 
which produces the most good. Good, according to the utilitarian, is achieved through 
the maximisation of utility; the total or average amount of pleasure, happiness, etc 
minus the total pain, suffering, etc across a population. Bentham describes this 
principle of maximising utility as “the principle that approves or disapproves of every 
action according to the tendency it appears to have to increase or lessen—i.e. to promote 
or oppose—the happiness of the person or group whose interest is in question” 
(Bentham, 1789, p.7). In other words, utilitarianism is morally aggregative with regards 
to its concept of well-being. As mentioned, HALYs assume a comparable aggregative 
approach and similar value statement in their calculation of population health.  
This position, however, might not seem entirely self-evident. As will be discussed 
later various alternative viewpoints exist as to the objective value of the same well-
being experience in different individuals. For example, in A Theory of Justice, Rawls 
proposes the difference - or maximin - principle through which the lot of the worst off 
should be maximised in any situation where a range of well-being states occur. The 
Rawlsian might, therefore, see funding de-worming instead of, for example, a very 
expensive cancer treatment as unjustified, seeing the life-saving effects of the cancer 
treatment as more valuable than the (albeit additively much greater) value of de-worming. 
A further assumption that seems potentially unjustified is QALYs’ setting of death 
as the 0 point for well-being (or 1 in the case of DALYs). This essentially assumes that 
no level of suffering will ever be worse than death. Furthermore, it assumes that we 
should always act to improve someone’s well-being rather than letting them die, even if 
they will never achieve a state of well-being which they perceive as preferable to death. 
Whilst medically it might be said that health states objectively reduce until death, when 
such a measure is used within ethical analyses ‘health’ becomes a measure of well-being; 
what is good for a person. It is therefore not clear in this context that death is the ‘worst’ 
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state of health. Given that there is a point at which life support machines are turned off, 
that suicides do occur, and that euthanasia clinics exist and are used; it might well be 
argued that expert opinion and people’s preferences do not coincide with the assumption 
of death as the lowest aggregative level of well-being. Negative forms of well-being, and 
therefore negative life years are not unimaginable, certain experiential states being seen a 
worse than death for example. On a well-being scale that stretches below 0, a given well-
being improvement remains exactly that, be it from -4 to -2, or 2 to 4. In situations where 
continuing to live is in fact worse than death, but death is not an option, a given health 
improvement could therefore still be judged as in the individual’s interests as it would 
make their continued existence slightly less unbearable.  
It might be responded that HALYs don’t intend to choose an ethical stance on death; 
that they simply exist to measure health improvements and that this goal may be met no 
matter how the extremes of the scale are anchored. However, if death is to be considered 
as an option and an individual is in a situation where their well-being cannot rise above a 
state preferable to death, a scale that extends below death (0) would allow for 
compassionate euthanasia, or the ceasing of life-prolonging measures to be considered as 
a possible course of action. Certainly, expensive life-prolonging interventions do not seem 
justified if their cessation (and consequently death) is concluded to be better for the 
patient. This ethical interpretation is, however, entirely unavailable if death is by definition 
considered maximally bad. Since the problem of the value of death is a species-
independent issue it will not be considered further here, however, it should be noted as 
an issue of potential concern in HALYs which endures when applied to species other 
than humans. 
Finally, it should be noted as fundamental to this thesis that current HALYs only 
consider the well-being of members of the human species. By disregarding other species 
they make the tacit assumption that human being well-being is the only one worth 
maximising, or that it should be considered as a separate good to the well-being other 
species. 
 
3 The need for inter-species HALYs 
One major problem with using health measures such as HALYs for cost-benefit analysis 
is their sole focus on human well-being. By only considering human health states and 
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diseases HALYs implicitly disregard every other species that, like humans, can benefit 
from well-being improvements and have an aversion to suffering. Such a bias does not 
seem justified, especially as most people do accept some kind of moral duty towards 
animals. For example, in Great Britain 91% of people agree with the statement 'we have 
a moral duty to minimise animals' suffering as much as possible' (Ipsos MORI, 2005). 
If we do indeed have an ethical duty to animals with respect to their well-being, then 
it follows that such a duty to should be able to be considered in ethical cost-effectiveness 
analysis assessments. Faced with a trade-off between relieving a dog’s boredom and 
saving a million hamsters from extreme pain, surely few would argue that there is no 
morally correct answer. Most people, I imagine, would favour the hamsters. However, 
faced with one bored hamster and a million dogs suffering agony our intuition, I should 
imagine, switches to the dogs. Clearly then we must accept that comparing moral worth 
across species is possible, a middle ground does exist balancing what matters to a dog and 
a hamster. An interspecies HALY would attempt to do just this; in measuring the interests 
of both dogs and hamsters (and all other sentient species), it would provide a considerably 
superior basis on which to make the trade-off decision than simple gut feelings.  
An extension to all species would increase the flexibility and relevance of HALYs, 
making them more suitable for a wider range of uses. QALYs, for example, are currently 
used extensively by the National Institute for Health and Care Excellence (NICE) to 
advise the NHS on drug research funding (Dobson, 1999). With the addition of animal 
HALYs such approaches would be available to veterinary science too. The Animal Health 
and Welfare Board for England’s recent policy paper AHWBE recommendation to allocate 
funds for animal health and welfare (Department for Environment Food & Rural Affairs, 
2018), for example, might have benefitted from the use of animal HALYs to measure the 
benefits of its recommendation for increased funding during the ‘Brexit’ transitional 
period. This would also have allowed for direct comparison to other similar areas of 
spending so as to demonstrate value for money. 
As an example of current application, DALYs are presently used by the non-profit 
GiveWell to rank charities based on how cost-effective they are at improving well-being, 
and thereby provide recommendations to donors on the most effective ways to give 
(GiveWell, 2018). Currently, however, only human charities are considered. The Centre 
for Effective Altruism (Effective Altruism, 2016) performs a similar function, however, 
charities are divided into animal and human categories leaving the donor to make an 
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entirely speculative and uninformed decision as to which categories they feel are most 
deserving. In this situation an inter-species HALY would represent a considerable step 
forwards in tools available to organisations such as GiveWell and the Centre for Effective 
Altruism, allowing for a more complete and inclusive ethical accounting in charitable 
giving. 
 
4 Inter-Species HALYs: what are the options? 
Once the ethical value of animal well-being accounting is granted, there remains a 
considerable potential discussion as to the relevant factors involved in calculating an inter-
species HALY. This is clearly a controversial subject mired in emotional intuition and 
historic precedent, as well as a wide range of potential lines for argument, however, if 
such a measure is to be realised a fully justified approach to relative well-being value must 
be established. As previously stated, in order to produce a HALY a measure of health 
state between 0 and 1 is produced (The HRQL weight), this is then multiplied by an 
expected lifespan. If an inter-species HALY measuring any form of well-being is to be 
realised, then a suitable method for generating HRQL weights must be created or chosen. 
This might consist in one single health state measure applied across all sentient species, 
or it might require several different species-specific measures. Furthermore, it might be 
argued that a HALY should not be valued equally across all species. Figure 2 below 
presents how an inter-species HALYs might be calculated. In the following section I 
discuss the arguments surrounding the relative value of different species’ well-being, and 
various approaches to measuring well-being that might consequently be used as a basis 
for inter-species HALYs.  
 
 
Figure 2: A potential inter-species HALY formula 
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1.3 Species-Specific Factors in Well-being 
In the following section I discuss various theories about well-being and how they might 
relate to an interspecies HALY. These would regulate what factors are measured in 
different species or individuals when assessing well-being. Whilst it will certainly not be 
possible to conclude on a final interpretation of well-being which applies to all species, 
nonetheless it will be relevant to note the various theories about well-being when 
considering its measurement across a range of dramatically different individuals. It should 
also be noted that whilst the theories considered here are broad, they are far from 
exhaustive; indeed, each one represents its own field of theories within which multiple 
variations exist. 
 
1.3.1 Hedonism: Pleasure/Pain 
Hedonism about well-being can be described by the following: 
1. All pleasure and only pleasure is good for us. 
2. All pain and only pain is bad for us. 
3. A person’s level of well-being is is dictated by the balance of pleasure and pain 
they are experiencing. 
In the first chapter of An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation, Jeremy 
Bentham, a founding figure in utilitarian thinking, states that “Nature has placed mankind 
under the governance of two sovereign masters, pain and pleasure. They alone point out 
what we ought to do and determine what we shall do; the standard of right and wrong” 
(Bentham, 1789, p6). This underlines the key hedonistic claim that what matters in 
maximising utility is the pleasure/pain scale. When discussing the ethical status of non-
human animals Bentham therefore argues that "The question is not Can they reason? or 
Can they talk? but Can they suffer?" (Bentham, 1789, p.144). Bentham maintains that if 
pleasure and pain are what truly matters, then we must attribute ethical value to any 
individual to whom such mental states are available. The fundamental morally relevant 
trait that we share is, according to Bentham, not our species, but our ability to suffer. 
This approach to inter-species HALYS might ideally look to measure well-being 
directly; for example fMRI brain scan data is becoming ever more reliable at measuring 
levels of pain in humans using SVM models (Brown et al., 2011, p.2), and levels of 
happiness as indicated by the activation of so called ‘hedonic hotspots’ such as the 
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orbitofrontal cortex (Bozarth, 2015, p.35). Equal quantitative pain or pleasure 
measurements between individuals under this approach might lead to equal value 
judgements. Apart from the considerable practical challenges that this approach would 
face with measuring and comparing levels of pleasure across species however, it does not 
seem obvious that pleasure and pain are the only things that matter to all animals. Indeed, 
even if hedonism is shown to be the correct model of human well-being, it does not 
necessarily follow that the same is true for all creatures. Might it not be possible to have 
a theory of well-being for a sentient species that does not feel pain? If an individual is 
under local anaesthetic, and so immune to pain yet still conscious, it still seems intuitively 
wrong to argue that no action we can do to it will negatively affect its well-being.  
The hedonist might respond that any further negative affects might be seen as 
impeding the individual’s pleasure, thus explaining our intuition that we can still do it 
harm. However, even if we do concede this point to the hedonist, it does not seem clear 
that the extent to which certain levels of pleasure and pain are valued will be the same 
across all individuals, let alone all species. It seems plausible that the degree of such signals 
might well be to some degree proportional to the animal’s body or brain size. If this were 
to be the case, would we not be committed to the assumption that a major factor when 
distinguishing ethically between species is size? Say ‘level ten’ pain for a blue whale is 
triggered by two thousand times the C-fibre stimulation needed to trigger the same 
response in a human being (about the same as the ratio of body masses), are we to say 
that the blue whale’s pain is two thousand times worse, and therefore two thousand times 
more worth alleviating? The hedonist may reply that, instead, measures of pleasure and 
pain should only be considered intra-species, and rely on some other factor when 
comparing value between species. Regardless, the problem remains that even amongst 
different human beings some may be more or less averse to pain than others, with higher 
or lower apparent pain thresholds according to their physiology. Although these 
differences may be smaller than those between species, it might still seem unreasonable 
that one person’s level 10 pain might be considered worse than another’s, resulting in 
them having comparatively more valuable extremes of well-being. One way to avoid this 





1.3.2 Desire Fulfilment: 
A desire fulfilment model of well-being might solve the problems posed by hedonism by 
focussing not on levels of pain, but on preferences for different states of being, whatever 
those might be. Although intra-species variation might still occur in preferences as in 
pain, it does not seem unreasonable to value one individual’s pain (or any other undesired 
experience) less than another’s if it transpired that they were less bothered by it. Desire 
fulfilment theory (DFT) about well-being might be described as the following: 
DFT: Something is (non-instrumentally) good for you if and only if and because it fulfils 
a non-instrumental desire of yours. Something is (non-instrumentally) bad for you if and 
only if and because it frustrates a non-instrumental desire of yours. 
(Fletcher, 2016, p.28) 
Pleasure might, under this system, also be considered a component to well-being, 
but not because pleasure is the fundamental unit of well-being (as held by hedonism), but 
because the individual desires pleasure. In an instance, therefore, where an individual does 
not desire pleasure, pleasure will no longer persist as a component of well-being. Imagine 
a period of mourning, for example, where an individual may perceive reflection, however 
painful, as more important than happiness in that moment. DFTs would allow such a 
preference to be judged as good for the individual simply because they desire it. A 
particular form of desire fulfilment, for example, is used in QALYs where individuals rate 
their experience of different health conditions, or their preference for potential health 
conditions.  
Our epistemic access to the internal experiences of non-human animals, however, 
is more restricted than in other humans to whom we can make empathetic assumptions, 
consequently this approach to measuring well-being would need to rely on various 
preference tests; especially in species without language and other methods of 
communication. For negative preferences/aversion there has been some success recently 
with scientists noting that injured and lame broiler chickens are more likely to eat feed 
containing painkillers, this would therefore suggest an aversion to pain (Danbury et al., 
2000). This raises the question however as to whether the painkillers do indeed directly 
improve the chickens’ well-being, or whether they simply serve as a temporary relief from 
a stimulus which exists to prevent further well-being losses. The chicken may, whilst 
under pain relief, be more likely to injure itself further despite not at that point showing 
aversion to the injuries, so that it is not obvious that its preferences really describe to a 
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full extent the factors contributing to its well-being. Especially among species without a 
concept of the future it therefore seems problematic to assume that by following their 
conscious preferences in the moment we will fully meet their well-being needs.  
Such inconsistencies in desire and perceived well-being might be explained by 
arguing that the objects of desire are relevant to well-being only because they tend to 
track some other measure. For example, different species might be said to have evolved 
to desire the particular things that are generally good for them. As Guy Fletcher argues 
“Desires are reliable trackers of prudential value rather than creators of it” (Fletcher, 2016, 
p.45). The desire theorist might respond noting that whilst evolution, or some other 
factor, may have driven different species to desire certain things, this does not alter the 
fact that what individuals experience and care about in the moment are desires. Whether 
or not one accepts the preference hypothesis, the ‘tracking’ concern might lead us to 
consider alternative foundations for well-being, with the possibility of different sources 
for different individuals and species. 
 
1.3.3 Objective List Theories 
Objective list theories (OLTs) about well-being claim that some things are good for 
individuals whether or not they desire them, in other words they deny that an individual’s 
desire is relevant in discerning what is good for it, a position known as attitude-
independence.  
Attitude-independence: it is not the case that G is non-instrumentally good for S only 
if S desires G. 
(Fletcher, 2016, p.50) 
OLTs span many different ideas about what is good. Since these theories are considered 
‘objective’, we are therefore also not free to make our own lists; OLTs claim that “the 
items on the list are all and the only things that are good for all humans” (Fletcher, 2016, 
p49). Amongst current well-being assessment methods in non-human animals OLTs 
form the majority, with Welfare Quality, the Animal Needs Index, TGI200 and the 
Animal Welfare Assessment Grid all citing various lists of things that are ‘good’ for a 
species, and that should be pursued by those responsible for their well-being. For example 
the most recent, Welfare Quality, measures well-being in terms of four defining principles; 
“Good feeding, Good housing, Good health, and Appropriate behaviour” which are 
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broken down into 12 welfare criteria, each criterion being measured by various species-
dependent indicators (Canali and Keeling, 2009). The components of the welfare 
principles are claimed to “reflect what is meaningful to animals as understood by welfare 
science” (Welfare Quality® consortium, 2009, p.14). 
 We must be wary of groupthink however; simply because something has been 
done a certain way practically in the past does not mean that it is the philosophically most 
justified option. A common argument against OLTs is that they often struggle to provide 
an explanation for the components on the list or justify their relative importance to each 
other. For example, it is not clear that ‘appropriate behaviour’ and ‘good health’ should 
be valued equally in the Welfare Quality measure (Sandøe et al., 2018, p.16). Additionally, 
it does not seem clear why certain items appear on each list, for example, the Animal 
Welfare Assessment Grid considers procedural parameters (for example when human 
input is required) in its assessment (Justice et al., 2017); yet clearly procedural elements 
will be irrelevant to wild animals, so that it seems odd to claim that this is fundamentally of 
value to any animal’s well-being. To do so would be to assume that wild animals are 
somehow lacking some component to their quality of life. In examples where no 
explanation is forthcoming OLTs simply do not seem philosophically satisfying. 
It may be noted, however, that not all OLTs are philosophically arbitrary in their 
conception. For example, current HALYs consider health to be the fundamentally 
valuable thing relating to well-being, basing this in community preferences and expert 
opinion. However, it might still be noted that this shared feature of HALY assessments, 
health, remains but a single component to what might be considered our full experience. 
It seems reasonable that health preferences might be affected by changes in other factors 
not linked to health. For example, a very rich, healthy individual who is able to pay for 
any amount of medical support to maintain their health might still be deeply unhappy as 
a result of other factors in their life. They might show strong preferences for more 
fulfilling yet less profitable life choices, despite the reduced health that they would have 
to accept as a consequence of that change. This possibility demonstrates the concern that 
OLTs can be alienating, lacking sensitivity to the true desires and experiences of the agent.  
 
1.3.4 Perfectionist Theories 
One way of grounding the benefits of OLT theories about happiness whilst avoiding the 
problems of alienation might be to consider a perfectionist theory of well-being. The 
12 
 
ancient philosopher Aristotle defined eudaimonia (well-being) as “activity of soul in 
accordance with virtue” (Aristotle, 2013, p.10). Furthermore, he argued that eudaimonia 
does not consist in the same thing for every individual. In the Nicomachean Ethics he 
argued “if the state of mind concerned with a man's own interests is to be called 
philosophic wisdom, there will be many philosophic wisdoms; there will not be one 
concerned with the good of all animals (any more than there is one art of medicine for all 
existing things), but a different philosophic wisdom about the good of each species.” 
(Aristotle, 2013). Aristotle believed that, for humans, this primarily consisted in their 
ability to reason, so that in reasoning well a human being may flourish. Such a position 
on human well-being might be defined as ‘human perfectionism’. 
(Human) perfectionism: What is non-instrumentally good for a human is determined 
by human nature. Human nature involves a specific set of capacities. The Exercise and 
development of these capacities is non-instrumentally good for humans.”  
(Fletcher, 2016, p.79) 
A HALY HRQL based on this concept of well-being might consider factors such 
as the fraction of time available for maximal exercise and development of natural 
capacities, a qualitative assessment of behaviour, and the degree to which an individual’s 
environment is natural. Assessment factors would, therefore, be similar to the 
‘appropriate behaviour’ criterion of the Welfare Quality measure (Canali and Keeling, 
2009, p.902). Across different species/individuals, assessments would depend on 
species/individual-specific capacities and natural behaviour. Such an approach would, for 
example, seem to echo well with the general approach taken by zoos to ensure that 
animals are kept in enclosures that mimic their natural environment and allow for natural 
behaviour and routines.  
Whilst the perfectionist approach may seem intuitive when applied to non-human 
animals, it might be perceived as highly problematic when applied to humans in particular, 
where ‘natural’ behaviour is a hazy concept. Human environments are hugely varied and 
constantly changing, with cultural and societal differences as well as considerably varied 
career and lifestyle choices making for a seemingly endless variety of options to consider 
in assessing natural behaviour and the exercising of natural capacities. It is not clear that, 
even for a given individual, there is truly a ‘natural behaviour’, or ‘natural environment’ 
of any relevance. Perfectionist theories of well-being would seem to ignore entirely the 
benefits of artificial environments such as Nozick’s proposed ‘experience machine’, a kind 
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of virtual reality in which maximal hedonistic fulfilment can be found (Nozick, 1974, 
pp.42–45). For some (such as Nozick himself) this might seem a natural conclusion, but 
to others it stands as a serious problem in the perfectionist approach. 
The supporter of perfectionist theories might see Nozick’s thought experiment 
as fundamentally demonstrating the validity of their position. They might argue that the 
perfectionist can value the majority of benefits of such a machine as supporting natural 
behaviour and maximising positive development, but also account for the intuition that 
the experience will never be fully perfect by making reference to it a fundamentally non-
natural environment. Finally, objectors might argue that whilst perfectionist criteria do 
seem to be connected to well-being, the connection is not explanatory but merely a 
correlation. The development of natural capacities might, therefore, be seen as tending to 
generate well-being as a consequence of sharing the same causal factor., be that pleasure, 
desire fulfilment, or other. 
1.3.5 Section Summary 
It is clear that the debate regarding the nature of well-being is not one that may be settled 
here. Nonetheless, the presence of a wide range of plausible theories I believe should 
encourage a particularly open-minded approach when well-being is assessed in different 
species, and indeed in different individuals intra-species. It seems that OLTs seem to have 
taken precedence in current measures when non-human animals are to be assessed which 
may be the natural result of the need for expert judgement in such assessments, however 
even if this approach is deemed most suitable an awareness of the various potential 
concepts about well-being remains crucial if a full and complete list/lists is/are to be 
compiled. 
 
1.4 Relative Moral Status 
In the following section, I discuss various approaches to applying a relative value of well-
being in different species (and individuals). The result of which would be a species-
specific conversion factor, or alternatively an approach by which relative value is realised 
within the HQRL measure itself. I discuss each approach to ascribing relative value in 
turn, considering how they might be justified, and then examining whether the 
implications raised by each approach lead to plausible outcomes. I also consider any 




1.4.1 Equal Moral Status 
Since HALYs have utilitarian origins, it might seem natural that inter-species HALYs 
would follow the classical utilitarian line that each individual counts equally, essentially 
removing any species conversion factors. If fundamental value is to be measured in 
happiness and suffering, for example, and all sentient beings can be happy and suffer, 
then the same quantity of suffering or happiness in two separate beings will be equally 
valuable. There is overwhelming scientific consensus that animals are sentient beings 
capable of a complex range of emotions (Low et al., 2012), they therefore consciously 
experience pain and suffering, as well as happiness and well-being. If we are willing to 
accept moral responsibilities towards human animals, out of empathy for fellow sentient 
beings that have the capacity to experience various states of well-being, then it might 
seem inconsistent not to extend the same responsibilities to other conscious animals too. 
As Francoise Wemelsfelder argues, we must “regard animals, fundamentally, as subjects”, 
she continues, “Working with another’s perspective is to recognise their presence, to 
realise there is someone there – an individual being, not a thing, with an outlook on the 
world, to whom things matter” (Wemelsfelder, 2012, p.228-229). By recognising the 
experience of all animals as being affected positively or negatively for similar reasons as 
human experience is, be that pleasure and pain, preference satisfaction or any other 
criterion, we might conclude that the corresponding value given to an equal level of well-
being is also the same. 
An objector to this position might note that the experience available to different 
individuals is very different. They might question, for example, whether it is reasonable 
to assume that the experiences of a house fly can be considered as producing well-being 
effects of equal value to those of a chimpanzee, or even a human being. Such an objection 
does not necessarily need to undermine the equality position though. The philosopher 
Peter Singer argues that, whilst “pain and suffering are equally bad—and pleasure and 
happiness equally good—whether the being experiencing them is human or nonhuman, 
rational or nonrational, capable of discourse or not” (Singer, 2009, p.576), nonetheless 
there remain various morally relevant factors  which affect how much and the kinds of 
well-being an individual might achieve. Singer imagines a world where adult human beings 
are kidnapped at random from parks for the purpose of painful or lethal scientific 
experiments, and argues that the resulting anticipatory terror would create suffering 
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additional to the pain of the experiment that would not be felt by non-human animals in 
the same situation (Singer, 1990, p.15). It might be argued, then, that equal value should 
be combined with a graduated view of the effect on well-being of any given experience, 
based on certain relevant aspects of experience.  
In his famous essay Utilitarianism, J.S. Mill expounds on this idea as a component 
of the Principle of Utility stating that “That principle is a mere form of words with no 
intelligible meaning unless one person’s happiness counts for exactly as much as another’s 
(assuming that they are equal in degree, and with the proper allowance made for 
differences in kinds of happiness —·see pages 5–8 above·). Bentham’s dictum, 
‘everybody to count for one, nobody for more than one’ might be written under the 
principle of utility as an explanatory commentary.” (Mill, 2008, p.42). If we are to include 
sentient animals as ethically significant individuals, then the ‘everybody’ referred to in 
Mill’s paraphrasing of Bentham might be interpreted to include them too. We might 
consequently be drawn to the conclusion that HALY HRQL weights for any species 
should be valued equally, removing any conversion factors from the equation in Figure 2. 
This option would, therefore, attempt to calculate absolute well-being value within each 
HQRL. 
In this model, a rat would, for example, not have a stated limit to its well-being 
value simply as a result of being a rat. Instead, it will be judged on the same scale as all 
other beings, its physiology being the only thing that may prevent it achieving the same 
levels of positive or negative well-being as others. Whilst technically an HRQL score of 
1 for maximal or minimal well-being is not unattainable to all creatures, it is simply the 
case that different species can expect to normally achieve different well-being maximums 
and minimums so that the HRQL benefits from the same intervention will differ across 
individuals. Such a system might, however, be said to produce unintuitive results. For 
example, it would condone the killing of a moderately happy human being in order to 
prevent the deaths of two fully contented rats were the rats’ full contentedness to produce 
a score of 0.5 on the objective well-being scale, whilst the moderately happy human being 
might only reach 0.8. Cumulatively the rats produce an HRQL score of 1 whereas the 
human only produces 0.8. This intuition against the rats might be explained if the 
numbers used turned out to be numerically implausible – it might be the case that rats 
simply cannot produce the levels of well-being cited in the example, full contentedness 
for them constituting a score closer to 0.2 for example. Alternatively, the intuition could 
be said to arise as the result of poor levels of epistemic access to the experiences of the 
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rats, preventing us from appreciating fully how much well-being they do indeed 
experience.  
 
1.4.2 Moral Status from Complexity of Experience 
One might agree with Singer’s argument that different kinds of experience are relevant to 
how much well-being is produced by a given event, but think that, rather than being 
influential factors in well-being effects, rather these differences create fundamental 
differences in the absolute value of different individuals. Such attributes could be seen as 
dictating and compounding how pleasant or unpleasant experiences are to an individual, 
making their maximal well-being states less ‘bad’ or ‘good’ in absolute terms. Essentially 
this approach would use qualitative differences to differentiate between quantitatively 
identical well-being states. Such an approach would, therefore, utilise the conversion 
factors shown in Figure 2. For example, one might interpret Mill’s caveat (cited earlier) 
that equality only follows with “proper allowance made for differences in kinds of 
happiness” (Mill, 2008, p.42) as referring to fundamental differences in the levels of well-
being attainable by different individuals. Following this, one might argue that the ethical 
value of a well-being change in a given species (or individual) should vary with as the 
quality and forms of happiness experienced, and the relative degree to which they may be 
appreciated. As such, different species’ (individuals’) HQRL weights would be calculated 
separately based on differing criteria. Relevant factors might practically be divided into 
differences in sensory inputs such as quality of vision, and differences in processing 
abilities or brain ‘hardware’ which might make individuals more aware of suffering. 
With regard to sensory inputs, the possession, or lack thereof, of a particular form 
of sensory perception will alter how much any given species will be affected by losses or 
gains with respect to that sense. For example, a pain stimulus of the same magnitude in a 
simpler organism such as a shrimp might produce less suffering than a stimulus of equal 
magnitude in a human because of the greater sensory complexity of the pain signal. 
Alternatively, a disease that impedes the hearing of a human being will undoubtedly be 
disabling, however, the same disease in a bat would be utterly devastating. Not only would 
its general well-being be degraded, hearing being a bat’s primary sense, but it would almost 
certainly lead to a slow and painful death from starvation as its ability to echolocate and 
hunt for food would be entirely compromised. The nature of a given species’ direct 
experience of the world as influenced by the array of sensory inputs available to them 
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might, therefore, be argued to have demonstrable ethical implications. Those that have 
more developed and complex sensory abilities could be seen as having more to lose than 
those in whom such abilities are not so developed, and therefore the relative value given 
to each species would vary in relation to this. 
The ethical value that each species receives from any given health change might 
also be influenced by the degree of mental processing available to them. These being seen 
as regulating an individual’s level of appreciation of its environment and self. Possessing 
a more developed neocortex, for example, leads to more complex social connections 
(Dunbar, 2001); this would, therefore, make experiences such as grief, abandonment and 
isolation more distressing. A similar compounding effect might be seen in species with 
greater intentionality and the ability to plan, making thwarted expectations harder to 
endure and heightening the rewards of achieving a goal. Similarly, the ability to form 
episodic memories would lead to past suffering causing more ongoing distress, and past 
benefits more happiness (Rogers and Kaplan, 2005, pp.183-186). In summary, the 
emotional interpretation of an equal stimulus might lead to a response of equal magnitude, 
yet be considered worse due to its greater complexity of emotion. It would, therefore, seem 
unreasonable to value the grief of a solitary sea turtle as equal to that of a sociable gorilla. 
Similarly, the thwarted expectations of a rat taught, as a reflex action, to expect food when 
a tone sounds will not be equal to those of a human with plans for future life ventures. 
As a result of these considerations about experience it might be argued that the value 
given to each species’ well-being should be proportional to their level of cognitive 
complexity and ability to experience positive and negative well-being states. 
A cat’s hedonistic HRQL score at maximum pleasure is 1 under this approach, 
and a human’s also 1. However, the cat might receive a species conversion factor of 0.4 
and the human 1, making the cat’s pleasure worth considerably less than that of a human. 
An implication of this approach would be that the cat could never be said to achieve the 
same level of well-being as even a partially happy human being. Even if we were to pump 
the cat full of dopamine to artificial levels orders of magnitude beyond those it might 
naturally achieve, equivalent to those of a human being’s maximal happiness, its pleasure 
would still be capped at the 0.4 level. 
It might further be objected that such an approach ignores the subjectivity of 
experience. It seems meaningless, for example, to ask whether a cat’s maximal aversion 
to something is ‘worth more’ than my maximal aversion to it. For example, level 10 
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suffering for a cat might be caused by the level of cognitive complexity required only for 
level 5 suffering in a human, however, it would not be true to say that the cat itself is only 
experiencing level 5 suffering. Experience is fundamentally subjective and so, to a given 
individual, all its senses or forms of experience go up to ‘level 10’. From this perspective 
then, different experiences might be seen as morally non-comparable. The supporter of 
an experience-based position might respond to this objection by arguing that whilst it is 
true that for the cat all its experiences go up to level 10 for it, nonetheless, there remain 
definite components to its experience which are less developed (such as social bonding 
perhaps). Whilst human and cat well-being scales might not be comparable, the human 
can still be said to have definite complexity to certain parts of its experience that the cat 
does not, they therefore have more to lose from a comparable event. Despite this being 
the case, however, the ‘complexity of experience’ supporter will struggle, I believe, to 
justify the same species conversion factor for all forms of well-being criteria (assuming 
multiple are to be considered). If it is the case that the cat feels pain with half the 
complexity, but happiness with equal complexity what conversion factor should we 
apply? Surely it might make more sense to simply include both complexity and magnitude 
in the initial HQRL rating than attempting to discount a magnitude assessment at a later 
stage. 
 
1.4.3 Moral Status Based on Proximity of Kinship 
The objector to the previous position might instead note the common tendency to assign 
greater value to their closer relatives, and similarly to members of their own species when 
compared to less closely related individuals. The preferential value assigned and greater 
level of personal sacrifice a parent is willing to make for their own child compared to 
another’s, for example, seems to be indicative of a correlation between biological kinship 
and our level of responsibility towards an individual. If we accept the premise that what 
is natural is what is good (following a similar vein of thought to perfectionist theories of 
well-being), then if it is natural to preferentially value one’s closer relatives, such an 
approach becomes the morally right thing to do. Such a concept of the value of other 
individuals might lead to a HALY system in which the well-being of fellow humans are 
valued the most, with a conversion factor approaching 1 applied to HRQLs, depending 
on the distance of relation. The well-being of our closest genetic relatives (chimpanzees) 
would receive a conversion factor equal to their genetic similarity to humans, and so on 
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to all conscious species. This approach would seem to justify the greater moral preference 
shown by a parent for their own child as compared to somebody else’s child. 
Arguments against this position point strongly towards a naturalistic fallacy; the 
idea that moral oughts cannot be derived simply from a description of the way the world 
is. That we have urges to preferentially value those most closely related to us does not 
mean that such an urge is necessarily linked to moral value. The greater responsibility of a 
parent to a child comes, it might be argued, from the same place as the responsibility to 
care for oneself; if you don’t do it, nobody else will. It is therefore a ‘responsibility’ of 
prudence but is devoid of any moral connections. As the Stanford Encyclopaedia of 
Philosophy notes; “Regardless of why one has a given trait, the question for a rational 
agent is always: is it right for me to exercise it, or should I instead renounce and resist 
it as far as I am able?” (FitzPatrick, 2016).  
 An implication of the kinship condition is that we would be led to value a more 
distantly related creature’s well-being as less even if it happened to experience its 
suffering/positive well-being more strongly than species more closely related to us. The 
value, for example, of a sentient alien capable of extremes of well-being beyond our 
imagination would always be 0 when compared to any terrestrial life form with which we 
share a common ancestry. We should therefore, following this approach, be prepared to 
sacrifice the alien’s life for even the most insignificant of well-being improvements to an 
earthworm, who might perhaps have experienced mild discomfort from being 
temporarily beneath the alien’s shadow.  
 
1.4.4 Section Summary 
Given that proximity of kinship does not seem to produce any ethically relevant basis for 
discrimination between individuals, and the degree by which an individual experiences 
the world seems sees to put unreasonable caps on an individual’s well-being, even if 
artificial, I believe a fundamentally equal approach remains most appealing. No 
conversion factor would, under this model, be applied in the equation shown in Figure 2 
so that equal well-being in different individuals will always be judged as equal. In the 
calculation of the HRQL (well-being) score, recognition would instead be given to the 
fact that different individuals will experience different levels of well-being following an 
equal change in their physical circumstances; for example, some species might naturally 
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experience less pain than others. Such an approach would be able to account for 
variations in the intensity of experience whilst also affording ethical status to highly 
developed aliens to whom we have no shared genetic history.  
 
5 Conclusion 
The aim of this thesis was to explore the ethical considerations of well-being 
measurement across multiple species, with specific reference to health-adjusted life years 
(HALYS). To do so it has discussed the need for the ethical recognition of non-human 
animal well-being as a consequence of their possession of conscious experience, and 
noted the lack of appropriate consideration in the present cost-effectiveness analysis 
outputs of health-adjusted life years. It has considered the possible forms that well-being 
might take across different species and individuals, analysing each and suggesting the 
implications these might have for an inter-species HALY. It also considered various 
potentially relevant criteria to the apportionment of graded (or not) ethical value across a 
spectrum of individuals, both within and across species. It reflected on the implications 
of applying equal value, experience-dependent value, and value according to proximity of 
kinship, and concludes that an equal value approach seems to represent the most ethically 
appealing option. 
If an inter-species health measure is to be realised, then considerable areas of further 
inquiry will be required. Fundamentally, more discussion is needed on the fundamental 
structure the measure should take, be that an adapted HALY, some other similar adapted 
measure, or an entirely new approach. Engagement between animal well-being experts, 
ethicists and other relevant interested parties will also be required to answer the questions 
discussed in this thesis, providing some consensus on the ethical standing and well-being 
systems of non-human animals. In a world of increased connectivity, heightened public 
interaction with contemporary issues, and a richer than ever scientific understanding of 
the conscious lives of animals, now more than ever there is call for an honest and full 
accounting of inter-species well-being. By simply providing perspective to the scale of 
avoidable animal suffering, let alone use in the appraisal of well-being improvement 
options, such a measure would provide untold value. Whilst an initial attempt might be 
basic and flawed, it would represent a first step on the path to a more complete and 
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